It is not correct to assert that Chinese protesters risked their lives and died on behalf of "human moral principles."6 The large majority of protesters were note that the subsequent articles uphold social and economic rights. Articles 22 to 26 list the rights to social security, work, rest and leisure, medical care, equal social protection for children "whether born in or out of wedlock," and education. Although such rights are not protected in the U.S. Constitution, they are no less 'basic' than civil and political rights in the UDHR. That is why the UDHR stands no chance of ever being taken seriously-in the sense of overriding domestic law-in the United States. Had Charney noted this point-that is, had he not read the UDHR through the lenses of the U.S. Constitution-it would have cast doubt (in a U.S. context, at least) upon his argument that the rights set forth in the UDHR are universal. ' Charney also suggests that American-style civil and political rights are universal because non-Western social critics uphold civil and political rights, often in opposition to their own governments. Chinese protesters in Tiananmen Square, for example, "fought and died for a right to free speech." Moreover, "What is striking is the extent to which the Chinese dissidents were reaching outside of their 'own' tradition. They were 'appropriating' the ideas of 'Western liberalism' to express their political aspirations." Charney supports this claim with a lengthy quote from the famous Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi. Fang, however, stayed away from Tiananmen Square in May and June 1989.2 More pertinently, most student protesters (not to mention the workers) were not inspired by Fang's 'universalism'.3 Instead, they drew upon the legacy of their May Fourth, 1919, predecessors, who argued that democracy was the best way to build up Chinese national power.4 Consider the speech by Wuer Kaixi, one of the student leaders at Tiananmen Square:
At present, our country is plagued with problems such as a bloated government bureaucracy, serious corruption, the devaluation of intellectual work, and inflation, all of which severely impede us from intensifying the reforms and carrying our modernization. This illustrates that if the spirit of science and democracy, and their actual processes, do not exist, numerous and varied feudal elements and remnants of the old system, which are fundamentally antagonistic to large-scale socialist production, will reemerge in society, and modernization will be impossible ... The spirit of May Fourth must be carried forward, and only then can our wish for a strong China be realized.
Fellow students, fellow countrymen, the future and fate of the Chinese nation are intimately linked to each of our hearts. This student movement has but one goal, that is, to facilitate the process of modernization by raising high the banners of democracy and science, by liberating people from the constraints of feudal ideology, and by promoting freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.... Our views are not in conflict with the government. We only have one goal: the modernization of China .... Fellow students, fellow countrymen, prosperity for our nation is the ultimate objective of our patriotic student movement.5
It is not correct to assert that Chinese protesters risked their lives and died on behalf of "human moral principles."6 The large majority of protesters were inspired by a patriotic vision of Chinese greatness, and American-style rights were viewed as means to this end.7 This theme is evident in most speeches and documents from the spring 1989 protests.8
In short, Charney has not made the case that American-style civil and political liberties are (or should be) universally viewed as fundamental human rights. This does not mean, however, that the quest for a truly universal human rights regime should be abandoned. In fact, a universal rights regime is already in place, but it is 'thinner' than American-style civil and political liberties. A small set of crucial rights are valued, at least in theory, by all governments in the contemporary world. The most obvious are the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination. These rights have become part of customary international law, and they are not contested in the public rhetoric of the international arena. Of course, many gross human rights violations occur 'off the record', and human rights groups such as Amnesty International have the task of exposing the gap between public allegiance to rights and the sad reality of ongoing abuse. This is largely practical work, however. Theoreticians can contribute with suggestions for expanding, and rendering more meaningful, this empirical, de facto consensus on universal rights. Charles Taylor's suggestion for expanding the current, rather thin list of universal human rights is particularly useful in this regard.9 Taylor imagines a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives of different traditions. He suggests that participants should be open-minded, leaving open the possibility of mutual learning from each other's "moral universe." Not all differences, however, can be reconciled. Taylor recognizes that different groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations hold incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, and human nature. In response, Taylor argues that a "genuine, unforced consensus" on human rights norms is possible only if we allow for disagreement on the ultimate justifications for those norms. We should try to abstract from those differences for the purpose of working out an "overlapping consensus" of human rights norms. As Taylor puts it, "we should agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we should be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief.""' Note that Taylor does not claim to be "transcending cultural particularity." Rather, representatives of different cultures would agree on the value of fundamental human rights norms, though they would agree for different reasons. But Taylor does not expect that we can forge an unforced consensus on universal human rights norms by overriding or "transcending" the norms of nonliberal cultures. If members of nonliberal traditions disagree with certain libinspired by a patriotic vision of Chinese greatness, and American-style rights were viewed as means to this end.7 This theme is evident in most speeches and documents from the spring 1989 protests.8
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During the course of cross-cultural dialogue, it is not inconceivable that non-East Asian states may also come to regard the right to be cared for by adult children as a fundamental human right. For example, Western participants may come to question the assumption that relatively fit elderly parents can be committed to nursing homes. More pragmatically, the promotion of filial piety can be seen as advantageous in an age when Social Security payments are no longer economically sustainable at their current level. If these arguments are sufficiently persuasive to non-Asian participants, perhaps all parties can agree that the right to be cared for by adult children should be included in the unforced consensus on human rights.14 To sum up, the interpretive approach-one that engages with different cultural traditions-is necessary for forging a desirable and feasible international human rights regime. But that is not the only (or even the main) virtue lese majestd. This aspect of the case is particularly concerned with my being Siamese and belonging to the Siamese cultural tradition.12
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NOTES
1. Charey might reply that the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ought to be universal and that he didn't mean to imply that civil and political rights are more fundamental than social and economic rights. The problem with this response is that the UDHR does not specify which rights are more fundamental than others and thus cannot be useful when rights conflict in practice (which helps to explain why the UDHR is generally viewed as a wish list of political desiderata, of little usefulness in concrete political disputes that involve trade-offs between valued goods). At least the U.S. Constitution has the virtue of rankings some rights above others (as does John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which ranks civil and political rights over social and economic rights). A defender of universal human rights must "identify a basic minimum of rights" that have priority over other rights and political goods. The assumption is that building human rights on traditional cultural resources-on the customs and values that people use to make sense of their lives-is more likely to lead to longterm commitment to human rights ideas and practices. Conversely, the group seems to recognize that defending rights by appealing to "human moral principles" is likely to be ineffective, if not counterproductive. NOTES 1. Charey might reply that the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ought to be universal and that he didn't mean to imply that civil and political rights are more fundamental than social and economic rights. The problem with this response is that the UDHR does not specify which rights are more fundamental than others and thus cannot be useful when rights conflict in practice (which helps to explain why the UDHR is generally viewed as a wish list of political desiderata, of little usefulness in concrete political disputes that involve trade-offs between valued goods). At least the U.S. Constitution has the virtue of rankings some rights above others (as does John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which ranks civil and political rights over social and economic rights). A defender of universal human rights must "identify a basic minimum of rights" that have priority over other rights and political goods. The assumption is that building human rights on traditional cultural resources-on the customs and values that people use to make sense of their lives-is more likely to lead to longterm commitment to human rights ideas and practices. Conversely, the group seems to recognize that defending rights by appealing to "human moral principles" is likely to be ineffective, if not counterproductive. NOTES 1. Charey might reply that the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ought to be universal and that he didn't mean to imply that civil and political rights are more fundamental than social and economic rights. The problem with this response is that the UDHR does not specify which rights are more fundamental than others and thus cannot be useful when rights conflict in practice (which helps to explain why the UDHR is generally viewed as a wish list of political desiderata, of little usefulness in concrete political disputes that involve trade-offs between valued goods). At least the U.S. Constitution has the virtue of rankings some rights above others (as does John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which ranks civil and political rights over social and economic rights). A defender of universal human rights must "identify a basic minimum of rights" that have priority over other rights and political goods. The assumption is that building human rights on traditional cultural resources-on the customs and values that people use to make sense of their lives-is more likely to lead to longterm commitment to human rights ideas and practices. Conversely, the group seems to recognize that defending rights by appealing to "human moral principles" is likely to be ineffective, if not counterproductive. NOTES 1. Charey might reply that the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) ought to be universal and that he didn't mean to imply that civil and political rights are more fundamental than social and economic rights. The problem with this response is that the UDHR does not specify which rights are more fundamental than others and thus cannot be useful when rights conflict in practice (which helps to explain why the UDHR is generally viewed as a wish list of political desiderata, of little usefulness in concrete political disputes that involve trade-offs between valued goods). At least the U.S. Constitution has the virtue of rankings some rights above others (as does John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, which ranks civil and political rights over social and economic rights). A defender of universal human rights must "identify a basic minimum of rights" that have priority over other rights and political goods.
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